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The recently introduced General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) is forcing several companies to make signicant
changes to their systems to achieve compliance. Motivated
by the nding that more than 30% of GDPR articles are re-
lated to storage, we investigate the impact of GDPR com-
pliance on storage systems. We illustrate the challenges of
retrotting existing systems into compliance by modifying
Redis to be GDPR-compliant. We show that despite needing
to introduce a small set of new features, a strict real-time
compliance (e.g., logging every user request synchronously)
lowers Redis’ throughput by 20×. Our work reveals how
GDPR allows compliance to be a spectrum, and what its im-
plications are for system designers. We discuss the technical
challenges that need to be solved before strict compliance
can be eciently achieved.
1 Introduction
“In law, nothing is certain but the expense.”
Samuel Butler
Privacy and protection of personal data (or more aptly, the
lack thereof) has become a topic of concern for the modern
society. The gravity of personal data breaches is evident
not only in their frequency (∼1300 in 2017 alone [19]) but
also their scale (the Equifax breach [14] compromised the
nancial information of∼145 million consumers), and scope
(the Cambridge Analytica scandal [21] harvested personal
data to inuence the U.K. Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S.
Presidential elections). In response to this alarming trend,
the European Union (EU) adopted a comprehensive privacy
regulation called the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [18].
GDPR denes the privacy of personal data as a fundamen-
tal right of all European people, and accordingly regulates
the entire lifecycle of personal data. Thus, any company
dealing with EU people’s personal data is legally bound to
*Aashaka Shah and Vinay Banakar contributed equally.
comply with GDPR. While essential, achieving compliance
is not trivial: Gartner estimates [13] that less than 50% of
the companies aected by GDPR would likely be compliant
by the end of 2018. This challenge is exacerbated for a vast
majority of companies that rely on third-parties for infras-
tructure services, and hence, do not have control over the
internals of such services. For example, a company building
a service on top of Google cloud storage system would not
be compliant if that cloud subsystem is violating the GDPR
norms. In fact, GDPR prevents companies from using any
third-party services that violate its standards.
Though GDPR governs the behavior of most of the infras-
tructure and operational components of an organization, its
impact on the storage systems is potent: 31 of the 99 articles
that make up GDPR directly pertain to storage systems. Mo-
tivated by this nding, we set out to investigate the impact of
GDPR on storage systems. In particular, we ask the following
questions: (i) What features should a storage system have
to be GDPR-compliant? (ii) How does compliance aect the
performance of dierent types of storage systems? (iii) What
are the technical challenges in achieving strict compliance
in an ecient manner?
By examining the GDPR articles, we identify a core set of
(six) features that must be implemented in the storage layer to
achieve compliance. We hypothesize that despite needing to
support a small set of new features, storage systems would
experience a signicant performance impact. This stems
from a key observation: GDPR’s goal of data protection by
design and by default sits at odd with the traditional system
design goals (especially for storage systems) of optimizing for
performance, cost, and reliability. For example, the regulation
on identifying and notifying data breaches requires that a
controller shall keep a record of all the interactions with
personal data. From a storage system perspective, this turns
every read operation into a read followed by a write.
To evaluate our hypothesis, we design and implement the
changes required to make Redis, a widely used key-value
store, GDPR-compliant. This not only illustrates the chal-
lenges of retrotting existing systems into GDPR compliance
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but also quanties the resulting performance overhead. Our
benchmarking using YCSB demonstrates that the GDPR-
compliant version experiences a 20× slowdown compared
to the unmodied version.
We share several insights from our investigation. First,
though GDPR is clear in its high-level goals, it is intention-
ally vague in its technical specications. This allows GDPR
compliance to be a continuum and not a xed target. We
dene real-time compliance and eventual compliance to de-
scribe a system’s approach to completing GDPR tasks. Our
experiments show the performance impact of this choice. For
example, by storing the monitoring logs in a batch (say, once
every second) as opposed to synchronously, Redis’ through-
put improves by 6×while exposing it to the risk of losing one
second worth of logs. Such tradeos present design choices
for researchers and practitioners building GDPR-compliant
systems. Second, some GDPR requirements sit at odds with
the design principles and performance guarantees of storage
systems. This could lead to storage systems oering diering
levels of native support for GDPR compliance (with missing
features expected to be handled by other infrastructure or
policy components). Finally, we identify three key research
challenges (namely, ecient deletion, ecient logging, and
ecient metadata indexing) that must be solved to make
strict compliance ecient.
2 Background on GDPR
GDPR [18] is laid out in 99 articles that describe its legal re-
quirements, and 173 recitals that provide additional context
and clarications to these articles. GDPR is an expansive set
of regulation that covers the entire lifecycle of personal data.
As such, achieving compliance requires interfacing with in-
frastructure components (including compute, network, and
storage systems) as well as operational components (pro-
cesses, policies, and personnel). However, since our investi-
gation primarily concerns with GDPR’s impact on storage
systems, we focus on articles that describe the behavior of
storage systems. These fall into two broad categories: the
rights of the data subjects (i.e., the people whose personal
data has been collected) and the responsibilities of the data
controllers (i.e., the companies that collect personal data).
2.1 Rights of the Data Subject
There are 12 articles that codify the rights and freedoms of
people. Among these, four directly concern storage systems.
The rst one, Article 15: Right of access by the data
subject allows any person whose personal data has been
collected by a company to obtain detailed information about
its usage including (i) the purposes of processing, (ii) the
recipients to whom it has been disclosed, (iii) the period for
which it will be stored, and (iv) its use in any automated
decision-making. Thus, the storage system should not only
be designed to store these metadata but also be organized
to allow a timely access. Related to this is the Article 21:
Right to object, which allows a person to object at any
time to using their personal data for the purposes of market-
ing, scientic research, historical archiving, or proling. This
requires storage systems to know both whitelisted and black-
listed purposes associated with personal data at all times,
and control access to it dynamically.
However, prominently, Article 17: Right to be forgot-
ten grants people the right to require the data controller to
erase their personal data without undue delay1. This right
is broadly construed whether or not the personal data was
obtained directly from the customer, or if the customer had
previously given consent. From a storage perspective, the
article demands that the requested data be erased in a timely
manner including all its replicas and backups. Finally, Article
20: Right to data portability states that people have the
right to obtain all their personal information in a commonly
used format as well as the right to have these transmitted
to another company directly. Thus, storage systems should
have the capability to access and transmit all data belonging
to a particular user in a timely fashion.
2.2 Responsibilities of the Data Controller
Among the articles that outline the responsibilities of data
controllers, 10 concern storage systems.
Three articles elucidate the high-level principles of data
security and privacy that must be followed by all controllers.
Article 24: Responsibility of the controller establishes that
the ultimate responsibility for the security of all personal
data lies with the controller that has collected it; Article 32:
Security of processing requires the controller to implement
risk-appropriate and state-of-the-art security measures in-
cluding encryption and pseudonymization; and lastly, Article
25: Data protection by design and by default, species
that all systems must be designed, congured, and adminis-
tered with data protection as a primary goal.
There are several articles that set guidelines for the col-
lection, processing, and transmission of personal data. The
purpose limitation of Article 5: Processing of personal data
mandates that personal data should only be collected for
specic purposes and not be used for any other purposes.
From a storage point, this translates to maintaining associ-
ated (purpose-)metadata that could be accessed and updated
by systems that process personal data. Interestingly, Article
13 also ascertains that data subjects have the right to know
the specic purposes for which their personal data would
be used as well as the duration for which it will be stored.
The latter requirement means that storage systems have to
support time-to-live mechanisms in order to automatically
erase the expired personal data.
1Article 17 covers only the personal data, not the insights derived from
it; nor can it be used to violate the rights of other people or law enforcement.
No. GDPR article Key requirement Storage feature
5.1 Purpose limitation Data must be collected and used for specic purposes Metadata indexing
5.1 Storage limitation Data should not be stored beyond its purpose Timely deletion
5.2 Accountability Controller must be able to demonstrate compliance All
13 Conditions for data collection Get user’s consent on how their data would be managed All
15 Right of access by users Provide users a timely access to all their data Metadata indexing
17 Right to be forgotten Find and delete groups of data Timely deletion
20 Right to data portability Transfer data to other controllers upon request Metadata indexing
21 Right to object Data should not be used for any objected reasons Metadata indexing
25 Protection by design and by default Safeguard and restrict access to data Access control, Encryption
30 Records of processing activity Store audit logs of all operations Monitoring
32 Security of data Implement appropriate data security measures Access control, Encryption
33, 34 Notify data breaches Share insights and audit trails from concerned systems Monitoring
46 Transfers subject to safeguards Control where the data resides Manage data location
Table 1: Key GDPR articles that signicantly impact the design, interfacing, or performance of storage systems. The table maps
the requirements of these articles into storage system features.
Finally, while Article 30: Records of processing activi-
ties requires the controller to maintain logs of all activities
concerning personal data, Article 33: Notification of per-
sonal data breach mandates them to notify the authorities
and users within 72 hours of any personal data breaches. In
conjunction with Accountability clause of Article 5 which
puts the onus of proving compliance on the controller, these
articles impose stringent requirements on storage systems:
to monitor and maintain detailed logs of all control- and
data-paths interactions. For instance, every read operation
now has to be followed by a (logging-)write operation.
Table–1 summarizes these articles and translates their key
requirements into specic storage features.
3 Designing for Compliance
Based on our analysis of GDPR, we identify six key features
that a storage system must support to be GDPR-compliant.
Then, we characterize how systems show variance in their
support for these features.
3.1 Features of GDPR-Compliant Storage
Timely Deletion. Under GDPR, no personal data can be re-
tained for an indenite period of time. Therefore, the storage
system should support mechanisms to associate time-to-live
(TTL) counters for personal data, and then automatically
erase them from all internal subsystems in a timely man-
ner. GDPR allows TTL to be either a static time or a policy
criterion that can be objectively evaluated.
Monitoring and Logging. In order to demonstrate com-
pliance, the storage system needs an audit trail of both its
internal actions and external interactions. Thus, in a strict
sense, all operations whether in the data path (say, read or
write) or control path (say, changes to metadata or access
control) needs to be logged.
Indexing via Metadata. Storage systems should have inter-
faces to allow quick and ecient access to groups of data. For
example, accessing all personal data that could be processed
under a specic purpose, or exporting all data belonging to
a user. Additionally, it should have the ability to quickly re-
trieve and delete large amounts of data that match a criterion.
Access Control. As GDPR aims to limit access to personal
data to only permitted entities, for established purposes, and
for predened duration of time, the storage system must
support ne-grained and dynamic access control.
Encryption. GDPR mandates that personal data be en-
crypted both at rest and in transit. While pseudonymization
may help reduce the scope and size of data needing encryp-
tion, it is still required and likely results in degradation of
storage system performance.
Managing Data Location. Finally, GDPR restricts the geo-
graphical locations where personal data may be stored. This
implies that storage systems should provide an ability to nd
and control the physical location of data at all times.
3.2 Degree of Compliance
Though GDPR is clear in its high-level goals, it is intentionally
vague in its technical specications. For example, GDPR
mandates that no personal data can be stored indenitely
and must be deleted after its expiry time. However, it does not
specify how soon after its expiry should the data be erased?
Seconds, hours, or even days? GDPR is silent on this, only
mentioning that the data should be deleted without an undue
delay. What this means for system designers is that GDPR
compliance need not be a xed target, instead a spectrum.
We capture this variance along two dimensions: response
time and capability.
Real-time vs. Eventual Compliance. Real-time compli-
ance is when a system completes the GDPR task (e.g., deleting
expired data or responding to user queries) synchronously in
real-time. Otherwise, we categorize it as eventually compli-
ant. Given the steep penalties (up to 4% of global revenue or
e20M, whichever is higher) for violating compliance, com-
panies would do well to be in the strict end of the spectrum.
However, as we demonstrate in §4, achieving real-time com-
pliance results in signicantly high overhead unless the chal-
lenges outlined in §5.1 are solved. This problem is further
exacerbated for organizations that operate at scale. For ex-
ample, Google cloud platform informs [2] their users that
for a deleted data to be completely removed from all their
internal systems, it could take up to 6 months.
Full vs. Partial Compliance. Distinct from the response
time, systems exhibit varying levels of feature granulari-
ties and capabilities. Such discrepancies arise because many
GDPR requirements sit at odds with the design principles
and performance guarantees of certain systems. For exam-
ple, le systems do not implement indexing into les as a
core operation since that feature is commonly supported
via application software like grep. Similarly, many rela-
tional databases only partially and indirectly support TTL
as that operation could be realized using user-dened trig-
gers, albeit ineciently. Thus, we dene full compliance to
be natively supporting all the GDPR features, and partial
compliance as enabling feature support in conjunction with
external infrastructure or policy components.
We use the term strict compliance to reect that a system
has achieved both full- and real-time compliance.
4 GDPR-Compliant Redis
Redis [3] is a prominent example of key-value stores, a class
of storage where unstructured data (i.e., value) is stored in
an associative array and indexed by unique keys. Our choice
of Redis as the reference system is motivated by two reasons:
(i) it is a modern storage system with an active open-source
development, and (ii) key-value stores, in general, are not
only widely deployed in Internet-scale systems [10, 16, 22]
but are also an active area of research [6, 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 23].
From amongst the features outlined in §3.1, Redis fully
supports monitoring, metadata indexing, and managing data
locations; partially supports timely deletion; oers no native
support for access control and encryption. Below, we discuss
our changes—some involving implementation while others
simply concerning policy and congurations—towards mak-
ing Redis, GDPR compliant. This eort resulted in∼120 lines
of code and conguration changes within Redis.
Then, we evaluate the performance impact of our modi-
cations to Redis (v4.0.11) using the Yahoo Cloud Serving
Benchmark (YCSB) [8]. We congure YCSB workloads to use
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Figure 1: Performance overhead of GDPR-compliant Redis.
YCSB benchmarking shows that monitoring and encryption
will each reduce Redis’ throughput to ∼30% of the original.
2M operations, and run them on a Dell Precision Tower 7810
with quad-core Intel Xeon 2.8GHz processor, 16 GB RAM,
and 1.2TB Intel 750 SSD.
4.1 Monitoring and Logging
Redis oers several mechanisms to generate complete audit
logs: a debugging command called MONITOR, conguring
the server with slowlog option, and piggybacking on append-
only-le (AOF). Our microbenchmarking revealed that since
Redis anyway performs its journaling via AOF, the rst two
options result in more overhead than AOF. Also, MONITOR
streams the logs over a network, thus requiring additional
encryption. So, we selected the AOF approach. However,
AOF records only those operations that modify the dataset.
Thus, we had to update the AOF code to include all of Redis’
interactions. Our benchmarking shows that when we set
AOF to fsync every operation to the disk synchronously,
Redis’ throughput drops to∼5% of its original. But as Figure 1
shows, when we relaxed the fsync frequency to once every
second, the performance improved by 6× i.e., throughput
dropped only to ∼30% the original.
Key takeaway: Even fully supported features like logging
can cause signicant performance overheads. Interestingly,
the overheads vary signicantly based on how strictly the
compliance is enforced.
4.2 Encryption
In lieu of natively extending Redis’ limited security model,
we incorporate third-party modules for encryption. For data
at rest, we use the Linux Unied Key Setup (LUKS) [1], and
for data in transit, we set up transport layer security (TLS)
using Stunnel [4]. Figure 1 shows that Redis performs at
a third of its original throughput when encryption is en-
abled. We observed that most of overhead was due to TLS:
this was because the TLS proxies in our setup had reduced
the average available network bandwidth from 44 Gbps to
4.9 Gbps, thereby aecting both latency and throughput of
YCSB. While there are alternatives to the LUKS-TLS approach
like key-level encryption, our investigation using the open-
source Themis [5] cryptographic library showed similar per-
formance overheads.
Key takeaway: Retrotting new features, especially those
that do not align with the core design philosophies, will
result in excessive performance overheads.
4.3 Timely Deletion
While GDPR does not mandate a timeline for erasing the
personal data after a request has been issued, it does specify
that such data be removed from everywhere without undue
delays. Redis oers three groups of primitives to erase data:
(i) DEL & UNLINK to remove one or more specied keys
immediately, (ii) EXPIRE & EXPIREAT to delete a given
key after a specied timeout period, and (iii) FLUSHDB &
FLUSHALL to delete all the keys present in a given database
or all existing databases respectively. The current mecha-
nisms and policies of Redis present two hindrances.
The rst issue concerns the lag between the time of request
and time of actual removal. While most of the above com-
mands erase the data proactively, taking a time proportional
to the size of data being removed, EXPIRE* commands
take a passive approach. The only way to guarantee the re-
moval of an expired key is for a client to proactively access it.
In absence of this, Redis runs a lazy probabilistic algorithm:
once every 100ms, it samples 20 random keys from the set of
keys with expire ag set; if any of these twenty have expired,
they are actively deleted; if less than 5 keys got deleted, then
wait till the next iteration, else repeat the loop immediately.
Thus, as percentage of keys with associated expire increases,
the probability of their timely deletion decreases.
To quantify this delay in erasure, we populate Redis with
keys, all of which have an associated expiry time. The time-
to-live values are set up such that 20% of the keys will expire
in short-term (5 minutes) and 80% in the long-term (5 days).
Figure 2 then shows the time Redis took to completely erase
the short-term keys once 5 minutes have elapsed. As ex-
pected, the time to erasure increases with the database size.
For example, when there are 128k keys, clean up of expired
keys (∼25k of them) took nearly 3 hours. To support a stricter
compliance, we modify Redis to iterate through the entire
list of keys with associated EXPIRE. Then, we re-run the
same experiment to verify that all the expired keys are erased
within sub-second latency for sizes of up to 1 million keys.
The second concern relates to the persistence of deleted
data in subsystems beyond the main storage engine. For ex-
ample, in Redis AOF persistence model, any deleted data per-
sists in AOF until its compaction either via a policy-triggered
or user-induced BGREWRITEAOF operation. Though Re-
dis prevents any legitimate access to data that is already
deleted, its decision to let these persist in various subsys-
tems, purely for performance reasons, is antithetical to the
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GDPR goals besides exposing itself to side-channel attacks.
A naive approach to guaranteeing an immediate removal of
deleted personal data is to trigger AOF compaction every
time a key gets deleted. However, since GDPR only man-
dates a reasonable time for clean up, it may be prudent to
congure a periodic (say, hourly) AOF compaction, which in
turn would guarantee that no deleted key persists beyond
an hour boundary.
Key takeaway: Even when the system supports a GDPR fea-
ture, system designers should carefully analyze its internal
data structures, algorithms, and conguration parameters to
gauge the degree of compliance.
5 Concluding Remarks
We analyze the impact of GDPR on storage systems. We nd
that achieving strict compliance eciently is hard; a naive
attempt at strict compliance results in signicant slowdown.
We modify Redis to be GDPR-compliant and measure the
performance overhead of each modication. Below, we iden-
tify three key research challenges that must be addressed to
achieve strict GDPR compliance eciently.
5.1 Research Challenges
Ecient Logging. For strict compliance, every storage op-
eration including reads must be synchronously written to
persistent storage; persisting to solid state drives or hard
drives results in signicant performance degradation. New
non-volatile memory technologies, such as Intel 3D Xpoint,
can help reduce such overheads. Ecient auditing may also
be achieved through the use of eidetic systems. For exam-
ple, Arnold [11] is able to remember past state with only 8%
overhead; adapting Arnold for GDPR remains a challenge.
Ecient Deletion. With all personal data possessing an
expiry timestamp, we need data structures to eciently nd
and delete (possibly large amounts of) data in a timely man-
ner. Like timeseries databases, data can be indexed by their
expiration time, then grouped and sorted by that index to
speed up this process. However, GDPR is vague in its inter-
pretation of deletions: it neither advocates a specic timeline
for completing the deletions nor mandates any specic tech-
niques. Thus, it remains to be seen if eorts like Google
cloud’s guarantee [2] to not retain customer data after 180
days of delete requests be considered compliant behavior.
Ecient Metadata Indexing. Several articles of GDPR re-
quire ecient access to groups of data based on certain at-
tributes. For example, accessing all the keys that allow pro-
cessing for a particular purpose while ignoring those that
object to that purpose; or collating all the les of a particu-
lar user to be ported to a new controller. While traditional
databases natively oer this ability via secondary indices,
not all storage systems have ecient or congurable support
for this capability.
5.2 Limitations and Importance
Given its preliminary nature, our work has several limitations.
First, we investigate one particular storage system, Redis, us-
ing one benchmark suite, YCSB. Expanding the scope to a
broader range of storage systems like relational databases
and le systems would increase the condence of our nd-
ings. Next, it is likely that the performance of our GDPR-
compliant Redis could be further improved with a deeper
knowledge of Redis internals. Finally, while we focus exclu-
sively on storage systems, researchers have shown [20] how
GDPR compliance requires organization wide changes to the
systems that process personal data.
With the growing relevance of privacy regulations around
the world, we expect this paper to trigger interesting con-
versations. This is one of the rst eorts to systematically
analyze the impact of GDPR on storage systems. We would
be keen to engage the storage community in identifying and
addressing the research challenges in this space.
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